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By James C. Hathaway 
The following essay is based on a talk 
delivered at the Global Consultation on 
lnternational Protection convened by the 
lnternational Council of Voluntary Agencies 
(ICVA) in Geneva on Dec. 11, 2001, on the 
occasion of celebrating the 50th anniversary 
of the Refugee Convention and the Ministerial 
Meeting of States Parties to the 1951 
Refugee Convention andlor its 1967 
Protocol, held Dec. 12-13, 2001. Under the 
author's supervision, students in the 
University of Michigan Law School's 
Program in Asylum Law produced research- 
based working papers to assist the ICVA and 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in 
discussing implementation of the Refugee 
Convention. (See related story on page 11 .) 
A complete version of this talk is to appear in 
issue 13 of Forced Migration Review in May 
2002. (See w.w.w.fmreview.org for back 
issues and subscription information; the 
journal is published in English, Spanish, and' 
Arabic.) This excerpt appears with permission I 
of Forced Migration Review. 
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The )fact that states b e  now committed 
b - 1 s  ". . . CQ cmider wap that m y  
t I bed to strenghen the 2 ementation of the 195 1 Convention 
m&r 1967 Protocol" is a wonderful 
M. We should celebrate the fact that 
&ex a half-century, we may finally be on 
the verge of taking oversight of the treaty 
seriously. 
1 am concerned, howeve;, that having 
watched this matter languish for half a 
century, activists may now feel the need 
immediately to build on t h  new 
coanmitmenr by endorsing some lnnd of a 
mechanism - even if only a minimally 
effective one - for overseeing the Rehgee 
Convention. I worry that we may allow 
ourselves to be rushed into embracing a 
parti& model for oversight of refugee 
nghts in order to lock-in at least some 
progress on t h ~  issue, only to find that we 
have ~ommitted ourselves to an approach 
that, in the long run, reany is inadequate. 
While there is of course the possibility that 
a minimalist project may provide the 
experience and confidence needed to move 
in a more ambitious direction in the future, 
there is also the possibility that states will 
take the view that, havingestabkhed a 
minimalist mechanism, they have "dealt 
with the supervision question." Thus, they 
might argue, there is no need to revisit the 
isshe, at least not any time soon. 
We simply cannot afford to sell out the 
future of refugee protection in a hasty bid 
to establish something that looks; more or 
l& like an oversight mechanism for the 
Refugee Convention. 
To be clear, this debate is not about 
how to stay on top of UNHCR [United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] 
as an agency. UNHCR has a mandate that 
is much broader than supervising the 
Refugee Convention. In recent years, its 
work as a humanitarian relief agency has, 
in fact, come to overshadow its core 
protection functbns. Its work on behalf of 
the internally displaced has in many 
instames eclipsed its primary duty to 
protat refugees. It has often taken on roles 
that put it into the realm of the political, 
notwiht%nd'pg its explicitly non-political 
mandate. VVhile there can and should be 
initiatives more effectively to supervise 
UNCHR as an agency, these are matters 
which, to my mind, are logically entrusted 
to UNHCR's executive committee 
(EXCOM), or indeed to the ECOSOC [UN 
Economic and Soclal Council] itself. We 
should not allow the question of how best 
to oversee the Refugee Convention to be 
redurected toward difficult but distinct 
questions of s u m g  UNHCR's 
compliance with its broader statutory 
mandate, much less of how to monitor the 
various jobs it has taken on outside of its 
mandate. 
On the other hand, it is equally wrong 
for UNHCR to attempt artificially to cut off 
debate on the appropriate range of 
potential mechanisms to oversee the 
Refugee Convention by reliance on its 
institutional authority under Article 35 of 
the Refugee Convention. As we all know, 
UNHCR has a special responsibility under 
Article 35 to "supervise h e  impktat ionn  
of the Refugee Convention. But this 
provision does not create a monopoly on 
treaty oversight in favor of UNHCR. To the 
contrary, the Convention, as an 
international pact, is the ,responsibility of 
the states that signed it. As the mechanisms 
for enforcement of the Convention itself 
make dear, it is states that have the 
fundamental right and duty to ensure that 
other states actually live up to their 
obligations under the Refugee Convention. 
There is nodung in Article 35 whlch 
precludes the states that are both the 
objects and the trustees of the refugee 
protection system from deciding to 
establish an arms-length mechanism to 
provide general guidance on, and oversight 
of, the Refugee Convention. Indeed, a 
move in hi direction is precisely what I 
believe is required now. 
In considering this task, a first question 
must surely be: Why is it that the Refugee 
Convention, virtually alone among major 
human rights treaties, still has no 




In part, it is a question of history. The 
Refugee Gonventim was the second major I 
hurnan rights treaty adopted by the United 
Nations, having been preceded only by the I 
Genoclde Convention. It is noteworthy that 
the Genocide Convention, like the Refugee 
Convention, is not externally supervised. 
In part, then, the absence of an external 
supervisory mechanism for the Refugee 
Convention is simply a reflection of the 
htorical realiq that, in the late 1940s and 
early 19505, the entire idea of interstate 
supervision of hurnan rights was new, 
potenually threatening, and not truly 
accepted by states. Yet with the adoption 
of the human rights covenants and more 
specialized treaties beginning in the 
mid-1960s, the establishment of an 
independent mechanism for interstate 
oversight of the human rights treaties has 
become routine. Unless there is some 
good, principled reason why refugee law 
should be immune from this general 
commitment, it is high time to reverse the 
historical aberration by bringing the 
commitment to oversight of refugee law 
into line with the practice in human rights 
law more generally. 
It might be suggested, however, that it 
was - and is - the existence of a United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
that distinguishes refugee law from every 
other UN human rights project. Only in 
refugee law is there an international 
organization assigned exclusively to 
supervise implementation of the treaty. At 
best, other UN human rights treaties can 
rely on the recently established, generic . 
authority of a (grossly under-funded) UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
Because refugee law has its own 
institutional guardian in the person of the 
High Commissioner, it might be thought 
that any additional mechanism for 
omsight would be superfIuous. 
I believe that this would be a tragic 
error of judgement. UNHCR clearly makes 
some essential contributions to oversight of 
the Convention via its supervisory 
authority codified in Article 35. In 
particular, the Department of International 
Protection (DIP) has real expertise in 
assisting governments to draft policy and 
lewlation; in engaging directly and 
indirectly in defensive case interventions; 
and in organizing and conducting refugee 
law outreach and training. DIPS role is 
complemented by the critical function of 
UNHCR's Executive Committee, which 
symbolically reaffirms the commitment of 
states to refugee law, and provides 
democratic legitimacy to the agency's work. 
There is therefore no need for a 
mechanism of international oversight to 
take on any of these roles. 
But there are also some things that are 
usually understood to be central to a 
meaningfd project of international 
oversight that UNHCR does less well, and 
is perhaps not ideally positioned to take 
on. In practice, neither DIP nor EXCOM 
has done enough to provide systematic, 
non-crisis policy guidance on the substance 
of refugee law, carefully anchored in the 
real context of protection challenges. There 
has been a lack of leadership in the design 
of mechanisms to implement burden and 
responsibility sharing, so as to enable the 
imperatives of refugee law duties to be 
reconciled to the political and social 
realities of asylum states. There has not 
really been a genuinely inclusive range of 
voices, including those of refugees 
themselves, brought into the supervisory 
process. And not enough efforts have been 
made to empower local institutions to 
make enforcement of refugee rights 
meaningful in a way that no international 
institution can ever aspire to do. These are 
all examples of the kinds of work which, in 
most other contexts, are entrusted to an 
autonomous supervisory body. 
Beyond the importance of setting 
reasonable expectations for the sorts of 
supervisory tasks that UNHCR, should itself 
be expected to take on, there are two more 
fundamental reasons why vesting UNHCR 
with sole responsibility to oversee the 
Refugee Convention is not a credible 
proposition. 
First, UNHCR has been fundamentally 
transformed during the (1990s from an 
agency whose job was, in large measure, to 
serve as trustee or guardian of refugee 
rights as implenknted by states, to an 
agency that is now primarily focused on 
direct service 'delivery. Simply put, 
UNHCR is no longer at arms-length from 
the implementation of refugee protectioA. 
' In most big refugee crises around the 
world today, UNHCR is - in law or in 
fact - the means by wbch refugee 
protection is delivered on the gound. 
UNHCR therefore faces a dilemma, in my 
view. Either it must return to concentrating 
on the implementation of its core 
supervisory responsibhties, and leave what 
has become the majority of its operational 
mandate to others; or it must concede that 
it cannot ethically supervise itself, and 
endorse the estabhhment of a genuinely 
arms-length body to ensure the oversight 
of the Refugee Convention. 
Second, the difficulty with relying solely 
on UNHCR to oversee the Refugee 
Convention is that it encourages states to 
avoid the meaningful accountability 
between and among themelves that is at 
the root of the entire international human 
rights project. Because states presently take 
little if any direct responsibility for 
ensuring that their fellow states live up to , 
international refugee law obligations, the 
dynamic of persuadmg, cajoling, and 
indeed shaming of partner states - so 
critical to the success of the international 
human rights project in general - is 
largely absent in refugee law. It is simply 
too easy to leave the task to UNHCR. 
Yet, as we all know, UNHCR is not 
really positioned to apply meaningful 
forms of pressure on states. UNHCR is, 
after all, an entity with a tiny core budget, 
and which is effectively dependeq on the 
annual voluntary contributions of a very 
small number of powerful states, virtually 
none of which has been predisposed to 
empower UNHCR to act autonomously to 
advance a strong regime of international 
refugee protection. Yes, these states have 
been generous in providing funds for 
refugee relief and for humanitarian 
assistance. But too often they have either 
avoided or, on occasion, evaded UNHCR's 
insistence on the importance of protection 
principles. Recent tragic events'off the 
coast of Australia, an4 the legally 
indefensible domestic reaction to the 
attempt to bring intematioqil law to be=, 
on Australia, are more than adequate 
testimony to this problem.' I 
Moreover, because UNHCR is, and will 
remain, politically and fiscally constrained 
by design, it cannot reasonably be expected 
to provide the sort of strong voice in favor 
of unflinching attention to refugee , , , 
protection that is now required. There may 
also be no good reason to compromise 
UNHCR's on-the-ground efforts to 
promote implementation of the Refugee 
Convention - which do freqqenMy rhuire 
compromise and even expedieilcy in the 
interest of saving )lives - by forcing that 
same organization to be the source of" 
critique and broad guidance on acceptablg 
intemational practice under the Refugee 
' 
Convention. Nor G y  it be reasonable to 
expect UNHCi as an interstate 
organization; to devise the sorts of complex 
political mechanisms - involving 
internationd burden and responsibility 
sharing - that are critical to the continued 
efkctiveness of refugee lpw in the modem 
world. 
In short, my point is that those of us 
concerned to advance refugee protection 
would be ill-advised to limit the scope of 
our thnkmg'to models that are housed 
within, or functionally intertwined with, 
the work of UNHCR as an international 
organization. By the same token, UNHCR 
as an organization would be ill-advised to 
insist that any mechanism to reinforce 
oversight of the Refugee Convention be 
situated within its walls. To do so may 
simply constrain its operational /,a 
effectiveness in protection and other fields, 
and reinforce the current sense of despair 
among many UNHCR staff brought on by 
expectations not matched by either 
political independence or f~cal  autonomy. 
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Because no precise model of oversight 
for the Reluge Convention will be 
adopted imminently, there is no need to 
rush to embrace any p@cular approach. 
Having waited 50 yea?, it is better to take 
the time to engage @ asolid, broadly based 
initiative to build a ~ ; e ~ h a n i m  of oversight 
that wb11 withstand the test of time. We 
must comrnit ou~~elves to a process of 
learning t$e lssons of human rights 
history, and of thinldng hard and creatively 
about the -text-specific goals of 
overseeing refugee law. Only on the basis 
of such a process will we be able to put 
f o m d  a model for serious, genuinely 




to -medght df 
cxl?f&t3:m s&0d at the *thg 
' parties in l!kcemb& ro embrace ' 
rny pWwh"~ d e l  for werifight of the 
mty. Ft is critical rhrr PVE take the time to 
lmm the lmm of treaty oversight in 
other plm &,the UN syssgsrcm. In particular, 
the ~ ~ e s  and failures d&e sk major 
Udced Nations treaty bodies provide a 
d t b  pf idomdon, bo& for d against 
@mhr modes of d & t ,  which we 
ignore at OUT peril. At a time when the 
chmrpe~021~ of all ofrhe UW human fights 
treaty bodies &kt ori regular coordination 
and  laming:, it would be sadly 
ironic far those of us in the refugee 
pmtqqLion commudy to m h  forward to 
embrace any model not predicated on an - 
intimate knowledge of the range of 
p&&d protection op&m. 
b emclusion, we-must not be 
intipdilated by institutianal insistence that 
me-lt of the Refugee Conventfon be a -- 
fumtion exclusively of the W C R .  The 
High Comnissioner's duty to supervise 
implementation af the Convention and the 1 ' 
more general obligati-f state parties to 
take collective responsibility to oversee 
their treaty obligations are, in fact, 
&es in Europe, North America, Oceania, 
Asia, atzd Afnoa, and is a mgulcz~r Eecturer tit 
hth the In-d Secretariat ofAmmty 
1 ~ -  and fke Europm C d l  a 
&&gees a d  EjciEw. 
Irnm*& prior to j&mg the Univmity 
tfMichigmfmIrty in 1998, H h 4 y  wm 
prr,&Sf3r afh at thc O S ~ ~ W  Imv 
Schod of York University, in TOIQPI@ 0984- 
1 ~ , w h m h c s m d r r r ~ ~ B c ~ a r d  
fa* director of the Refugee bw Resmmh 
~ n i t . ' ~ e  was previuusb o pmfasor at tkc 
&ole dc droit & I'Univ+di Mumton 
0980-1983; consuItm~ m S p d  lkgd 
Assistiwefor &e I X S U & V ~ ~ ~  to thE 
C&n D e p a m  af&& (1983-1984); 
Fulbright Senior Vittng Sicbhr-at the 
University of  California at Bmkky (1991- 
19921: d held he  Fmmm Chair in 
I ? ' t ~ & d   COF?I?TQF&~ hW & fk 
University of Cali&&'s Hastings Cdkge of 
the h w  (1996-1997).  or Hutkawa. presmdy t& 
Intern&& L&w, E n t m M  Ite- h, 
Comparative A s y h  Law, and an 
intmEtiscipZimry mcwch seminar on 
Emerging Respomes &o Forced Migration. 
James C. ~~~y is profisor ofb 
and direc~r Of thC PlQgrQm in &$gee and 
&Zum h w  at the University gf MkhIg~n 
Law S c b L  He is also senior visiting ~ ~ u r t h  
moda& at Oxford University's R e h e  
Studies Program. 
P70fessur Haekqway is a leading aurtkorify 
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c o m m  Law warl$. He is the awthor of a 
teadug treathe on fib refugee aqini~on, The 
b a r  of Refugee @tteworths, 1B1) 
and, most recmt~, editor of Reconceiving 
Interntiom1 Refugee Law @Cluwer, 1997). 
He hns Pka pmvidod training on refugw law 
to acadtpi~~ non-gmernrnentd rmd o&id 
